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CHAPTER I 
REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
The purpose of this dissertation is to present evi-
dence of a relationship between the schizophrenic syndrome 
and a cognitive ability called social intelligence by Guil-
ford (1967) among others. The proposed relationship specifies 
that social intelligence is impaired in the schizophrenias 
through peculiarities in the scanning and sorting of inter-
personal data. 
This posited relationship however, requires an ex-
amination of its components, i.e., schizophrenia and social 
intelligence, not only in a definitional sense, but also in 
terms of the development of the components' current meanings. 
The review of schizophrenia will focus briefly on 
definitional issues. The main concern, for research, how-
ever, is to present evidence that meaningful differentia-
tions can be made within the syndrome, and between it and 
nonschizophrenic processes. 
Next, the construct of social intelligence is re-
viewed with reference to definition and measurement. This 
is followed by a discussion of selected variables relevant 
to cognitive style, i.e., scanning, cognitive categories, 
and inhibition. The relationship of these variables to 
2 
social intelligence is explored. 
Finally, hypotheses relating the anticipated deficits 
in social intelligence to the cognitive styles of paranoid 
and nonparanoid forms of schizophrenia are presented. 
Schizophrenia 
In 1911 Bleuler (1950) published his work on dementia 
praecox. One of his contributions was the renaming of the 
syndrome as schizophrenia, meaning that the process was 
marked by a splitting off of so-called psychic functions, 
e.g., affect from cognition. His work challenged the idea 
that schizophrenia was a single disease entity. The syn-
drome had many forms. One central symptom of any form, 
however, was a thought disturbance which he labeled as 
autism. 
In Bleuler's context, autism represented a dual pro-
cess. First there occurred a turning away from the stimuli 
of the outside world which, in turn, aided, and was rein-
forced by, the development of private symbols often used or 
associated illogically. 
Harry Stack Sullivan (1931, 1953) later proposed that 
schizophrenia was engendered by poor early interpersonal re-
lationships. These relationships, their messages, and af-
fective content, determined the shaping of the "self"--a 
fragile repository of attitudes towards oneself and others. 
Consequently, the schizophrenic who had been subjected to a 
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host of negative early messages and affects found it ex-
tremely difficult to relate later to others. Moreover, he 
carried a special form of anxiety when dealing with others. 
This special anxiety or "terror" sprang from the schizo-
phrenic' s inability to understand the rules that governed 
interpersonal relations (Sullivan, 1962). 
Like Bleuler, Sullivan conceived a process that would 
make conununication with others difficult. Unlike Bleuler 
however, Sullivan differentiated those called schizophrenic 
into so-called true schizophrenics and hebephrenics, the 
latter representing an untreatable organic state. 
Arieti (1955) incorporated the notions of Bleuler, 
Sullivan, and others to formulate a link between symboliza-
tion and desocialization. In that context, withdrawal from 
or severe limitation of contact with others occurred after 
a process of private symbolization had been initiated. Thus 
a paranoid who could not understand the meanings or intentions 
of others (or to whom understanding was anxiety arousing) 
would "invent" meanings to be attributed to others. While 
the resultant thinking might appear to be an uncomfortable 
persecutory delusion, it was preferable, to the paranoid, to 
great anxiety. (Note that Arieti's priorities are the re-
verse of Bleuler's.) 
Whichever comes first, desocialization or the in-
vention of private symbols, there appears to be agreement 
that the two reinforce one another. This is however, a 
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relatively minor issue when viewed in the perspective of the 
history of the schizophrenic syndrome, and the arguments 
that have been {and are) waged around it. 
Issues such as treatability, and so-called functional 
versus organic etiology, are important and deserve additional 
research. Such issues, while generating much activity, may 
have hidden a more fundamental question, namely, can schizo-
phrenia be meaningfully defined. This question becomes more 
complex when the following definition of schizophrenia by 
Bellak {1958) is considered: 
Schizophrenia or dementia praecox is a psychiatric syn-
drome not a single disease. The somewhat variable symp-
toms generally associated with this diagnostic label must 
be understood as the final common path of a number of 
conditions which may lead to and manifest themselves in 
a severe disturbance of the ego. These conditions may 
range from a relatively purely psychogenic weakness of 
the ego to afflictions of ego functioning by disturbances 
brought about by infections, arteriosclerotic, enzymatic, 
toxic, or by traumatic, constitutional, or genetic 
factors: ••• While an outstanding somatic factor may 
be present, usually this must be accompanied by some 
psychological predisposition {in terms of ego patterns) 
to produce the schizophrenic picture ••• (pp. 4-5). 
The above statement is both a theory and a definition. 
Bellak's statement that schizophrenia is a syndrome rather 
than a single disease must be studied more closely. The 
usual meaning of syndrome is, " ••• group or set of con-
current symptoms which together are indicative of a disease 
••• " (Hinsie & Campbell, 1960, p. 714). In Bellak's def-
inition, however, the usage is closer to that of the general 
adaptation syndrome wherein stress causes a relatively pre-
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dictable set of symptoms, but the exact nature of the stress 
may vary, or, more to the point, the cause of the stress may 
vary. 
Bellak's definition also represented an attempt to 
take a middle or moderating position. The rift in research 
on social abilities was mild when compared to that in studies 
and theories of schizophrenia. Issues regarding treatability, 
etiology, prognosis etc. remain open and researchers are 
still beset by the problem that samples diagnosed as schizo-
phrenic may be drawn from different populations. 
The issue of this non-unified nature of schizophrenia, 
i.e., its status as a syndrome, raises another question: 
is it reasonable to discuss schizophrenic subgroups? Part 
of the answer is to look for symptom clusters which are found 
by different investigators in a fairly reliable or consistent 
fashion. 
This sort of inquiry however, has two parts: (a) 
consistency of differentiating schizophrenias from non-
schizophrenias 1 and (b) consistency of isolating subgroups 
within the schizophrenias. If these two demands are met, 
it would be reasonable to begin to describe not ~ cognitive 
style, but rather two or more styles, each associated with a 
relatively well isolated subgroup. 
The first requirement is to determine whether or not 
schizophrenics are differentiated from nonschizophrenics 
reliably. Schmidt and Fonda (1956) found acceptable con-
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sistencies for gross diagnostic categories e.g., organic, 
psychotic, used by psychiatrists, but very little agreement 
for subtypes such as hebephrenic. This study reported 90% 
agreement concerning a schizophrenic-nonschizophrenic dis-
tinction. This agreement between pairs of psychiatrists was 
78% when nonpsychotic patients were removed from the sample. 
Sandifer, Pettus, & Quado (1964) reported a 74% figure for 
similar distinction, a higher figure than found with any other 
diagnostic category. In a longitudinal study of 1,215 out-
patients, Babigian, Gardner, Miles and Romano (1965) found 
that 70% of those diagnosed as schizophrenic received that 
same general diagnosis on subsequent contacts. This same 
study also reported that 70% was the highest figure found. 
In a review of reliability studies, Spitzer and Endicott 
(1970) report an average concurrence rate of 75% between 
pairs of diagnosticians, again for the schizophrenic versus 
nonschizophrenic distinction. 
Agreement rates in the 70s, while not conclusive, 
were promising. Spitzer and Endicott (1970) suggest that 
concurrence rates would rise, if more experienced clinicians 
were used. Briefly, their rationale is that diagnostic signs 
such as "flat affect" are often confused with other states 
e.g., "shallow affect" or "constricted affect." 
This reasoning and the relative consistency of find-
ings in reliability studies suggest that (a) there are a 
series of signs or diagnostic indicators to which clinicians 
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respond, but that (b} the power of these signs vary for pur-
poses of differential diagnosis. 
Tables 1 and 2, adapted from Spitzer and Endicott 
(1970), indicate that the sign approach alone is insufficient. 
Table 1 shows symptoms by subgroups, presents a brief defini-
tion, and finally indicates which other diagnostic categories, 
if any, are suggested. Table 2 provides a brief listing of 
possible diagnostic "errors" associated with subgroup schizo-
phrenic diagnoses. The validity of some of the distinctions 
made may be questioned, but the total picture suggests that 
training and experience could avoid diagnostic errors. The 
situation here is similar to that of the sign approach in 
psychological testing (Weiner, 1966). 
The purpose of Table 1 was to show some possible 
sources of diagnostic error assuming a simple sign approach 
were used. It does not indicate what information could be 
used to differentiate between such items as flat, as opposed 
to, constricted affect. This consideration adds another 
dimension, i.e., amount of information, to the experience-
training issue raised by Spitzer and Endicott (1970). The 
question of diagnostic error as a function of both experi-
ence and amount of data given, or used, awaits further re-
search. 
The error source mentioned above interacts with 
another difficulty, namely, the number of subtypes of schizo-
phrenia. Even assuming that these subtypes are valid and 
\ 
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Table 1 
Diagnostic Value of Different Signs in Schizophrenia 
Sign Definition 
A. Symptomatology practically pathognomic 
1. Flat affect Generalized impover-
ishment of emotional 
reactivity 
2. Thought Thinking appears con-
Disorder fused, bizarre, incor-
rect or abrupt 
3. Posturing Assumption of bizarre 
or inappropriate pos-
ture 
B. Symptoms seen in schizophrenia--rarely 
1. Ca ta tonic 
Stupor 
2. Inappropriate 
Affect 
Marked decrease in re-
activity to environ-
ment, reduction of 
spontaneous movement. 
Patient seems unaware 
of surroundings but 
generally very aware 
Affect incongruous to 
situation or thought 
content 
Other Diagnoses 
Shallow affect 
in organicity 
and hysteria 
Distinguish from 
looseness of 
association in 
mania 
Sometimes seen in 
organic brain 
disease 
in other conditions 
Common to cata-
tonia but rule 
out depression, 
hysteria and 
organicity 
As above 
c. Symptoms common 
l. Extreme social 
to schizophrenia and 
Avoids contact or in-
volvement with people 
other states 
Alcoholism and 
depressions 
2. Excessive con-
cern with body 
symptoms 
3. Hallucinations 
4. Delusions 
Symptoms real or 
imagined; fears of be-
coming ill. Health 
rituals 
Sensory impression in 
waking state in absence 
of external stimuli 
Belief apparently un-
true and extremely re-
sistant to modif ica-
tion 
Rule out depres-
sion and 
hypochondriasis 
Rule out LSD 
use, other 
psychoses 
Rule out organic 
and other f unc-
tional psychoses 
Table 2 
Major Differential Diaqnoses by Schizophrenia Subtypes 
Subtype Differential Diaqnoses 
Paranoid Involutional State 
Paranoia 
Amphetamine-Toxic State 
Schizoaffective Manic-Depressive Psychoses 
Chronic Undifferentiated Chronic Organic Brain Syndrome 
Chronic Use of stimulants or 
Hallucinoqens 
9 
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universally agreed upon does not remove the chance for error. 
Table 2, taken from Spitzer and Endicott (1970) suggests some 
of the problems of differential diagnoses. 
Table 2 only hints at the complexity of the issue, 
several subtypes are not listed, e.g., acute undifferentiated, 
hebephrenic, simple and pseudoneurotic to name a few. Worse, 
the reported lack of agreement for subtypes confounds diag-
nostic error with styles of usage. That is, there is lack 
of agreement between clinicians as to which subtypes repre-
sent viable diagnostic entities (Lehmann, 1971). 
The disparity regarding the useful number of schizo-
phrenic subtypes reflects the general difficulties in the 
history of psychiatric nosology. While the use of corrections, 
primarily through added information, might serve to increase 
agreement on gross categories, e.g., schizophrenic versus 
nonschizophrenic, other complications such as "favorite usage" 
appear to prevent even a complex sign approach from signif-
icantly increasing agreement regarding subtypes. 
One approach that might be useful is to reduce sub-
types to gross dichotomous distinctions. Of most importance 
here is the distinction between paranoid and nonparanoid forms 
of the syndrome. 
Kraepelin (1925) was the first to provide a com-
prehensive description of paranoid schizophrenia. While 
there have been disputes about the formation of symptoms 
(e.g., Freud versus Sullivan, see Arieti, 1955) its place 
as a major subtype has never been seriously challenged 
(Lehmann, 1971). 
ll 
Reference to Table 2 however, indicates that paranoid 
schizophrenia can be confused with other states. Rather 
than attempt a sign approach for differential diagnosis, the 
focus will shift to a different tradition. 
Moore's (1930) study of psychiatric patients was an 
early attempt to differentiate disorders by the use of 
factor analysis. The data gathered by Jl.1oorewas reanalyzed 
by Thurstone (1947) and later by Degan (1952). The three 
studies yielded different numbers of factors, with differ-
ing names and interpretations. Thus the results were not 
conclusive. Degan did isolate two primary factors: A • 
hallucination-delusion and E • schizophrenic dissociation. 
In addition he found a second order factor which was labeled 
as Y or paranoid-depressive. 
Wittenborn's work in the early 1950s was summarized 
by Eysenck (1961, pp. 22-23, 31). Factor analysis of the 
rating scales used by Wittenborn, Wolzberg, and Simon (1953) 
yielded nine clusters: (1) acute anxiety; (2) conversion 
hysteria; (3) manic states1 (4) depressed states; (5) schizo-
phrenic excitement; (6) paranoid condition; (7) paranoid 
schizophrenia; (8) hebephrenic schizophrenia; and (9) phobic-
compulsive. While it is encouraging to note the presence of 
scales 5 and 7, Eysenck noted that the scales, due to item 
overlap and high intercorrelations, are not independent. 
--
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Guertin (1952, 1954) using a sample of hospitalized 
schizophrenics, isolated six factors, of which one, persecu-
tion-suspicion, might relate to the paranoid form. Later, 
Guertin (1955) found three factors, with an out-patient 
sample, all of which pertained to lack of interest and with-
drawal. 
Although later work by Wittenborn (1962) confirmed 
the earlier finding of a so-called paranoid schizophrenia 
factor, little had been done to correlate factor titles with 
traditional psychiatric diagnoses. 
Again the picture was encouraging but not conclusive. 
Analyses by Degan, Wittenborn, and Guertin indicated that a 
paranoid schizophrenic factor was partially distinct from 
other schizophrenic factors. Whether this distinction re-
flected item construction or concurrence with traditional 
diagnoses was not specified. 
Following a theory proposed by Jenkins (1952), Lorr, 
Jenkins, and O'Connor (1955) (see also Lorr, O'Connor and 
Stafford, 1957), constructed 81 brief descriptive rating 
scales which were used on a sample of 423 hospitalized patients. 
Of the 11 factors extracted, four directly related to Jenkins' 
theory that there were three types of schizophrenia, namely 
the withdrawn (I), the disorganized (K), and those marked by 
psychotic disorganization {C). These factors, moreover, were 
compared to like named factor generated by other investi-
gators (Lorr & Rubinstein, 1956). 
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A more graphic form of cross-referencing of factors 
was done by Rabin and King (1958). Table 3 is a modifica-
tion of their presentation and indicates that paranoids may 
form a distinct subgroup of the schizophrenic syndrome. 
Moreover Klett and Lorr (1966) and Lorr (1966) reported that 
rating scales comprising Lorr's paranoid projection factor 
correlate reasonably well with the diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia. 
In conclusion, the status of paranoid schizophrenia 
as a distinct subgroup of the syndrome is supported by 
psychiatric theory and by both diagnostic and factor an-
alytic studies. Additional evidence, however, is needed. 
Rabin and King (1958) reviewed 10 years of research 
on intellectual impairment in schizophrenia. They concluded 
that this sort of deficit had not been demonstrated in the 
paranoid form. The impairments found for the simple and 
hebephrenic types could be attributed to factors such as 
motivation and attention. 
Later reviews (Shakow, 1962, 1963; Payne, 19611 and 
Lothrop, 1961) all concluded that paranoid schizophrenics 
showed less conceptual or intellectual impairment than did 
nonparanoid forms. The parallel of these results to dif-
ferences found between acute and chronic schizophrenics led 
to questioning of the difference between paranoids and acute 
schizophrenics. In response, Johannsen, Friedman, Leitschuh, 
and Ammons (1963) classified 52 schizophrenic patients in 
--
Table 3 
Comparison of Factors Obtained 
in Four Studies Based on Symptom-Ratings 
Degan Lorr et al. Wittenborn Guertin 
Hyperprojection • Perceptual Distortion = Par. Schiz. = 
Persecuted 
Byperprojection = Paranoid Projection = Par. Schiz. • 
Persecuted 
Schiz. Disociation = Conceptual Disorg. = (None) = 
Personality disorganization 
Deterioration = Withdrawal = Deterioration = Psychomotor 
Retardation 
14 
= indicates comparable factors; + indicates factorial overlap 
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terms of four variables or dimensions: (a) process-reactive 
in terms of developmental data criteria developed by Kantor, 
Wallner and Winder (1953); (b) acute-chronic defined by 
length of hospitalization; (c) good versus poor premorbid 
adjustment as measured by the Phillips Scale (1953); and (d) 
paranoid versus nonparanoid schizophrenic diagnosis. The 
first three dimensions correlated significantly and positively 
with each other, but negatively with the paranoid versus 
nonparanoid distinction. This finding indicates a difference 
between paranoid schizophrenia and acute schizophrenia. 
Finally, Johannsen (1961) found evidence suggesting 
differential impairment of social communication skills be-
tween paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics. 
There appears to be sufficient evidence to make 
three gross distinctions among psychiatric patients with 
functional disorders, namely, non-schizophrenic, paranoid 
schizophrenic, and nonparanoid schizophrenic. However, two 
qualifications must be restated: (a) each group is composed 
of subgroups (Klett & Lorr, 1966), and (b) the relative 
lack of impairment attributed to the paranoid schizophrenic's 
intellectual functioning may be due to other variables 
(Weiner, 1966). 
Social Intelligence 
In broad terms, social intelligence can be viewed 
as awareness of the thought and feelings of others. With 
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this context in mind, a continuum of this particular sensi-
tivity can be found in the field of fiction. The negative 
pole was exemplified in a story by Henry James, Beast in the 
Jungle (1958). John Marcher was the passionless anti-hero 
of this tale whose fatal flaw was near blindness to the 
feelings of others. 
The positive pole of this sensitivity, carried to 
sometimes painful examples of empathy, was pressed onto 
selected characters of Dostoevsky. His Prince Myshkin, the 
hero of the Idiot (1958), confused other characters with his 
mixture of naivete and insight. 
Early writers in the "pulp" genre presented a 
slightly different view of sensitivity to people in their 
characterizations. Thus Edgar Rice Burroughs in his ! Prin-
£!!!. 2£_ !!!!.,! (1911), typified his hero with all virtues save 
understanding of women. 
While this last example is primarily a literary 
device, it, together with the aforementioned writings of 
Henry James and Dostoevsky, indicates that at least some 
writers saw their characters as posse~sing varying degrees 
of social sensitivity. 
This special awareness of others however, was more 
than a creative fiction, for E. L. Thorndike speculated that 
social acumen was a distinct form of intelligence, that is, 
not necessarily correlated with other forms of human ability 
i.e., verbal or mechanical. Thorndike's (1920) definition 
--
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of "Social Intelligence" was, " ••• the ability to under-
stand and manage men and women, boys and girls • • • to act 
wisely in human relations ••• (p. 228)." 
Thorndike's definition helped spur interest in social 
intelligence and its measurement. At about the same time, 
as indicated by Walker and Foley (1973), interest arose in 
person perception. Walker and Foley defined this latter term 
as, "how people make judgments regarding others, their ac-
curacy in so doing, and personality characteristics of 'good' 
versus 'poor' appraisers of others ••• (p. 840)." 
The next three decades, roughly from the mid 1930's 
to around 1965, were marked by two curious patterns. The 
first was the development of a gap between investigations 
of person perception and those centering on social intel-
ligence. The second was intense but sporadic research on 
the concept of social intelligence. 
These patterns reflected a major difference in two 
traditions in Psychology, namely a matter of focus. Person 
perception examined stimulus differences while research on 
social intelligence was directed to matters of individual 
differences. In turn, focus influenced methodology and 
measurement. Stated very simply, this became a case of the 
standardized paper-pencil test used in measuring intelligence, 
versus the rating scales of social perception. The choice 
of instrument however, had at least two other ramifications: 
(a) There was limited success in constructing tests of social 
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intelligence. (This also relates to the sporadic interest 
in the subject.) (b) It appears that the choice of instru-
ments directed the researcher's attention to distinct portions 
of Thorndike's definition, i.e., the difference between 
understanding others and the management or action component 
involved in acting wisely. Each of these points will be 
elaborated. 
From Thorndike's definition in 1920 to the early 
1960's only two paper-pencil tests of social intelligence 
received extensive research attention. These were the 
George Washington Social Intelligence Test (GWSIT) and the 
Chapin Social Insight Test (CHSIT). 
Though revised in 1949, the GWSIT was one of the 
earliest instruments developed to measure social intelligence 
or SI (Thorndike & Stein, 1937). The revised form contained 
five subtests of which four were in multiple choice format. 
Examples of these subtests are (a) Observation of Human Be-
havior which contained true-false statements or questions 
concerning interpersonal functioning1 and (b) Sense of Humor 
which required the selection from four alternatives of the 
best ending of a joke. 
Early validity studies such as Hunt's (1927) showed 
promising relationships between GWSIT scores and ability to 
deal with people in work situations. This was soon challenged 
however. For instance, Garrett and Kellogg (1928) among 
others, cited a significant correlation between the GWSIT and 
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measures of abstract intelligence or AI. Later work by 
Thorndike (1936) and Woodrow (1939) indicated that the GWSIT 
primarily measured verbal factors. This same conclusion was 
noted by Cronbach in a later review (1960). 
Chapin was familiar with the GWSIT and probably its 
lack of success in measuring SI as a distinct factor. In 
1942 he presented some initial standardization data and the 
test items of the Chapin Social Insight Test or CHSIT. The 
CHSIT was composed of 25 items, each dewcribing a social 
situation. The testee was expected to read each item and 
then choose which of the four alternate statements was most 
relevant to the situation presented. 
However, there arose a parallel in research findings 
between the CHSIT and the GWSIT. Like the latter instrument, 
Chapin's test was found to relate well to external criteria 
such as leadership (Chapin, 1942), but Gough (1965, 1968) 
found significant correlations of the CHSIT to measures of 
abstract intelligence. 
Thus hopes to establish SI's relative independence 
from verbal or abstract intelligence were frus~rated, for 
high correlations implied redundancy in measurement. Per-
haps the ebb and flow of interest in SI was connected to the 
development of new and always promising tests. Perhaps too, 
investigators of social perception had not made this assump-
tion of relative independence. In any event, their progress, 
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as Walker and Foley (1973) pointed out, was generally smoother 
and more consistent. 
As noted, investigators of social abilities diverged 
into relatively independent streams with little cross-fer-
tilization. A possible contributer to this divergence could 
be the already set state of affairs wherein difference of 
method meant more than "choice of device." Cattell (1966) 
noted the various rifts between segments of psychology. The 
earmarks of such rifts ranged from lack of cross-referencing 
to mutual challenging of claimed results. More specifically, 
Cattell cited the multivariate versus bivariate experimental 
designs as representing distinct traditions in the philos-
ophy of science. 
Walker and Foley (1973) however, pointed out a less 
speculative cause of this lack of conununication. Workers 
on SI and those on social perception or social action were 
focusing on different parts of Thorndike's definition. As 
Walker and Foley stated: 
••• Thorndike specified two types of SI, namely, under-
standing others and wiae social action • • • it must be 
understood that knowing and action must be evaluated 
separately before their interaction can be assessed • • • 
social understanding itself is a necessary but not 
sufficient cause for wise social action. • -;-; This type 
of problem and research is not new to psychology and can 
be seen as analogous to other comparisons, such as that 
between learning and performance (p. 846). 
Definitions. As noted above, Thorndike's definition 
of SI included both understanding and action. This distinc-
tion, in part, reflects the later splitting of research 
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directions. Subsequent definitions of SI added to the com-
plexity of the picture. 
In an early review of SI literature, Vernon (1933) 
stated: 
••• 'social intelligence' apparently includes ability 
to get along with people in general, social technique 
• • • susceptability to stimuli from other members of a 
group, as well as insight into the temporary moods • • • 
of friends and of strangers ••• (p. 44). 
Vernon's definition (or overview) widened the bound-
aries of SI considerably. The inclusion of susceptability 
to group stimuli, which is viewed as a personality factor 
by Cattell (1971), raised the question of the relationship 
of other factors i.e., personality to SI. 
Later definitions appeared to limit the scope of SI. 
Thus Chapin (1942) made a distinction, so far unsupported by 
data, between SI and "social insight." 
Wechsler (1958), on the other hand, offered a brief 
and general definition, namely ability to deal with people. 
The relationship of this ability to WAIS scores or to a 
subtest such as Picture Arrangement has not been stipulated. 
The situation of SI then, up to and through 1960, 
was one of definitional haziness. Consequently it was (and 
is) difficult to determine its boundaries. The relationship 
between SI and such areas of research as empathy remain un-
known in any detail. Moreover the relative independence of 
SI from other types of intelligence was not established. 
However O'Sullivan, Guilford and deMille (1965) 
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proposed another definition of SI as a cognitive variable, 
namely, " ••• ability to understand the thoughts, feelings 
and intentions of other people as manifested in discernible, 
expressional cues • • • (p. 6)." 
The work of O'Sullivan et al. was predicated on a 
model initially suggested by Guilford (1956, 1957). This 
model was Guilford's structure of intellect theory which 
hypothesized 120 distinct intellectual aptitudes. In this 
structure of intellect model (hereafter referred to as SOI), 
30 forms of SI are proposed. 
It is important to consider the background of the 
SOI model, at least in general outline, so that the reason 
for the generation of so many factors can be appreciated. 
In The Nature of Human Intelligence, Guildord (1967) 
provided a thorough analysis of the thinking and research 
that led to the SOI model. There were three key points in 
this analysis. 
, 
The first point was a negative finding, namely that 
little or no research supported a hierarchial structure 
within which the known intellectual factors could be arranged. 
According to Guilford this type of structure would follow 
from concepts such as Spearman's "g" and "s" type factors. 
In Spearman's theory, "g" represented general intelligence 
and by definition correlates with any test of intellectual 
ability. "S" was a specific component peculiar to a given 
type of intelligence test. Thus a given test score could be 
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analyzed into "g" and "s" factors. The presence of "g" in 
tests, however, not only stipulated a superordinate factor, 
but also predicted a degree of correlation between tests of 
intelligence that has not been demonstrated. 
Guilford's second point also stems from negative 
findings, that is, the sparc~ty of so-called broad group 
factors or those represented by a large number of tests. On 
the other hand, a large number of narrow group factors (close 
to 40, Guilford, 1956), have been identified. This too 
militates against a hierarchical structure. 
The third and most important point is summarized by 
Guilford (1967) 
••• many factors have obviously parallel properties. 
For example, if one collects a half-dozen nonverbal 
factors in another, it is clear that the factors in the 
two sets can be paired off in a meaningful manner. The 
psychological operation is the same in each pair; only 
the content of the test items is different. Yet the 
members of each pair come out of an analysis as separate 
factors. • • • Extensive factor analytical results have 
proved wrong the belief that the same ability is in-
volved regardless of the kind of information with which 
we deal • • • (p. 61). 
Thus Guilford reasoned that tests of intelligence may 
be alike in some respects i.e., involve the same operation, 
but differ in others i.e., content. Moreover a third dimen-
sion, product was added. Therefore for a test, x, to measure 
the same factor as test, Y, tests X and Y would have to have 
the same content, utilize the same psychological operation 
and have correct responses expressed in the same level of 
product. Conversely, any intelligent act can be described 
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in terms of the above dimensions. 
The dimensions with their respective subcategories 
form a large block comprised of subcubes with each of the 
latter representing a cognitive ability. For purposes of this 
paper the SOI model has two chief implications: (a) the inter-
locking of dimensions fo form subcubes should aid in the con-
struction of tests to measure the ability specified in that 
cube1 and (b) tests targeted to the same subcube should cor-
relate more with each other than with tests targeted to other 
subcubes. (It may be argued that tests of behavioral content 
should correlate more with each other than, say, with those 
in the verbal content area, however, this is not strictly 
predicted by the SOI model.) 
There are 30 distinct SI abilities proposed by the 
SOI model. Tests of six of these abilities have been devised 
(O'Sullivan et al., 19651 O'Sullivan & Guilford, 1966). 
Three of these six tests were selected as an aid in defining 
SI in the present study. 
The selected tests are Expression Grouping, Missing 
Pictures and Cartoon Predictions. The first requires that 
the examinee relate facial or postural cues into a congruent 
whole which expresses one thought, feeling or intention. The 
latter two tests require understanding of the development and 
probable conclusion, respectively, of social situations. The 
definition of SI is therefore the ability to recognize the 
feelings, or intentions of another person, and, the ability 
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to understand basic interpersonal situations. The examina-
tion of test items also indicates that attention to behavioral 
cues is essential to both abilities (O'Sullivan et al., 1965). 
The next part of this overview relates to the devel-
opment of the concept of cognitive style. The focus will 
center on those elements of the schizophrenic's cognitive 
style which could affect attention to behavioral cues. 
Cognitive Style 
In a broad sense cognitive style is related to Freud's 
(1909) concept of the ego as moderator between the demands 
of the id and those of external reality. This idea was 
amplified by Gardner, Holtzman, Klein, and Spence (1959) 
under the name of "cognitive control." 
••• the organism must not only bring needs, im-
pulses and wishes into continual harmony; it must also 
resolve the many independent claims of reality. A person 
is always in a state of motivation, i.e., never without 
purpose. But while much of his behavior is concerned 
with reaching satisfying and desirable objects or states, 
his attempts at need satisfaction are molded by an even 
more central requirement of survival •••• In our view, 
a cognitive control describes an organizational tendency 
that relates the functioning of these structures (i.e., 
appraisal of reality) to each other within the person. 
It is an intervening structural condition accounting in 
part for the particular impact of a need on cognition 
(Gardner et al., 1959, pp. 3-4). 
In less analytic terms, cognitive style represents 
an interaction of intellectual, perceptual, and personality 
variables. This interaction has three components or dimen-
sions which are of main concern to this paper, environmental 
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scanning, cognitive filtering or categorization, and social 
inhibition. 
Scanning and Filtering. Sullivan (1960) cited the 
vigilance of paranoids as a defense against intimacy. Arieti 
(1955) elaborated this theme and speculated that the pre-
paranoid learns to defend against accusations by anticipation, 
an activity that contributes to alert scanning of the social 
environment. 
Broen (1966) and Broen and Storms (1966) noted that 
arousal level could influence scanning. Earlier, Broen 
(1964) had speculated that nonparanoids coped with high arousal 
by limiting their scanning. 
Cromwell (1968) proposed that deviant scanning was 
but one facet of the schizophrenic's approach to problem 
solving. Moreover, amount of scanning was insufficient to 
differentiate schizophrenic subgroups. Cromwell stated that 
schizophrenics are characterized by a maladaptive participa-
tory set which included not only extremes in scanning activity, 
but also defects in the make-up of cognitive categories, i.e., 
categories were unstable with shifting definitions or were 
too rigid. 
Silverman (1964; 1967) found evidence that paranoid 
schizophrenics scanned more widely than nonparanoid schizo-
phrenics. Silverman's formulation was based on two prin-
ciples identified by Gardner et al. (1959), namely scanning 
control and cognitive filterin~, aspects of cognitive control. 
--
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Scanning control reflected the amount or breadth of environ-
mental searching done by an individual. Cognitive filtering 
pertained to the structure of the cognitive categories used 
to organize information. The primary dimension of this 
categorical structure was that of narrowness versus wideness. 
The implications of either end of the continuum being rigid, 
restrictive compartmentalization versus diffuse disorganica-
tion respectively, Silverman found evidence that paranoid 
schizophrenics tended to be characterized by extensive 
scanning and filtering of data into narrow conceptual cate-
gories. Nonparanoid schizophrenics, on the other hand, showed 
a reverse tendency, i.e., little scanning and diffuse cate-
gorization. 
Silverman further hypothesized that the wide scanning 
of the paranoid leads to the reception of many unpleasant 
stimulii. Rather than limit scanning, which would reduce 
vigilance, the paranoid copes by forcing data into rigid 
nonthreatening categories. 
For the paranoid process at least, the relationship 
between scanning and f ilering appears to serve a defensive 
purpose, cognitive complexity is reduced to preserve vigilance. 
In like fashion, the nonparanoid schizophrenic reduces scan-
ning in an effort to control stimulation. The relationship 
between low scanning and diffuse categorization, however, is 
not clear. 
McGonaghy (1960) postulated that there were two ways 
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of deviating from normal associative patterns. A person 
might develop heightened capacity to assign logical mean-
ings to events. However, a "triumph of logic over conunon 
sense" occurs when a person resists data that would conflict 
with the original assignment of meaning. The other type of 
deviation is marked by a weakening of the capacity to assign 
meaning. This second pattern leads to vague, fragmented, and 
loose associations. McGonaghy assigned the first pattern to 
paranoids and the second to nonparanoid schizophrenics. 
Bower, Testin, and Roberts (1960) found some support 
for .McGonaghy's hypothesis. Scales of "disorganization" 
and "arbitrary tightening" were applied to the Rorschach 
protocols of several diagnostic groups. Nonparanoid schiso-
phrenics were high on the former scale; paranoid schizophrenics 
were higher than all other groups on the latter scale. 
The connection between scanning and filtering may not 
be limited to the schizophrenic syndrome. Obsessive com-
pulisve neurosis, for example, may represent a state having 
high scanning and a relatively large number of cognitive 
categories. This stance would allow for extensive gathering 
of data yet retard decision making and, therefore, the re-
sponsibility for acting on choices. 
There is a different question concerning the relation-
ship of scanning and filtering in the general or so-called 
normal population. Henry Clay Smith in Sensitivity to People 
(1966) has reviewed a number of studies pertinent to this 
--
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question. Smith concluded that six variables were necessary 
to account for the manner and accuracy with which one in-
dividual makes judgments about another. Two of these Smith 
labels as "judging habits of the perceiver." These habits 
are defined in terms of rating scale dimensions or response 
styles. Smith's analysis, plus those of Guilford (1954) 
and Cronbach (1955), suggest that there are several vari-
ables which determine a response or cognitive style. Of these, 
there is close correspondence between what Smith calls per-
ceiver "level" and "spread" and Guilford's (1954) analysis 
of the effect of constant errors of judges on rating scale 
scores. 
Smith also proposed that a reciprocal, and not always 
helpful relationship existed between the individual's skills 
of observation and his stereotypes, i.e., knowledge or 
prejudices about various groups, and what attributes would be 
expected to correlate with group memberships. In Smith's 
analysis "stereotype" knowledge represents a continuum from 
over-simplified gross prejudices to multiple analysis of a 
person in terms of his or her affiliations with several groups. 
In a similar sense, Gollin (1958) and Gollin and Rosenberg (1956) 
proposed a concept of "relational thinking." Their studies 
investigated the ability of subjects to link together seemingly 
disparate classes of social affiliation, e.g., state what the 
following have in common: Catholic, Buddhist, Conununist. 
Gollin found that subjects differed not only in cognitive 
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complexity, i.e., ability to see similarities and differences 
in affiliations, but also that this complexity or relational 
thinking ability correlated significantly with accuracy 
measures of judgments about others. Gollin also suggested 
that there was a negative correlation of relational thinking 
to speed of figure closure. Smith (1966) added that closure 
speed was a possible analog to the speed used to "shut off" 
data about others so that a decision might be made. This 
suggests that rapid closure interferes with scanning. 
The evidence suggests an inverse relationship between 
filtering and scanning for the schizophrenias only. The 
dovetailing of these components for other groups cannot be 
stated as simply. Figure closure speed may reflect scanning 
interference for schizophrenics, but not, for exa~ple, for 
workmen engaged in quality control tasks. Closure speed, 
however, is related to another dimension of cognitive style 
and is discussed below. 
Inhibition. Pemberton (1952) and Pawlik (1966) stated 
that closure speed is a component test of the personality 
factor called "inhibition" or "h" by Cattell (1965). Cattell 
saw one example of this inhibition to be a cautious and timid 
approach to events. "H" is a bi-polar factor related to 
inhibition and appears in Cattell's Sixteen Personali~y Factor 
Questionnaire (1957). Examination of the items comprising 
factor H indicates that H has special reference to the approach 
to social or interpersonal events. Roughly, H appears to re-
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late to the comfort experienced while engaging others, or 
being the center of attention. H, a specialized form of 
inhibition, is viewed in the present research as a potential 
influence an SI and shaper of cognitive style. High in-
hibition, for example, could limit the amount of social 
interactions and result in decreased practice. 
SI and Schizophrenic Cognitive Style 
A general conceptualization of the relationship be-
tween social intelligence and cognitive style can be made 
by analogy to the relationship between learning and perform-
ance. More specifically, Thorndike's definition of SI was a 
formulation of SI both as "learned" in the sense of a cog-
nitive ability, and "performance" in the sense of "acting 
wisely." Wise social action, however, might be expected to 
be associated with two aspects of cognitive style, namely 
scanning and cognitive filtering. These two terms approx-
imate the individual's appraisal of the social situation, 
an appraisal which is also influenced by the individual's 
prior experiences with social situations. A resultant 
function of the person's past dealings with people can be 
formulated as his readiness to deal with others as opposed 
to inhibition. 
The cognitive style with which a person approaches a 
situation is describable in terms of his filtering of data, 
scanning of data, and inhibition. His performance or ef-
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fectiveness in the given situation, however, is not only a 
function of his cognitive style and abilities, but also a 
function of two additional factors, namely, process and 
situation specific. Process means that the individual's 
style and ability for a given social event are actualized or 
retarded by the skills, or lack thereof, of the other par-
ticipants. Situation specific factors refer to the demands, 
structure, and purpose of the given social situation. 
Table 4 provides a summary statement of how three 
diagnostic groups might be expected to differ from one another 
and from an "idealized normal" group in terms of the di-
mensions. 
Social Intelligence, however, is not shown as a 
dimension but is viewed as a set of cognitive abilities. 
Extreme positions on any or all of the dimensions shown in 
Table 4 are hypothesized to impair SI, e.g., a severe con-
striction of scanning would result in reduced attention to 
behavioral cues. 
A different rationale accounts for the exclusion of 
inhibition as a dimension in Table 4. As indicated earlier, 
closure speed is a component of the inhibition factor and 
bears a possible relationship to the amount of environmental 
scanning done by the individual. Only extreme scores on both 
closure speed and inhibition, however, appear to have implica-
tions as sources of interference. It may be a sound analogy 
to relate speedy closure to overly quick decision making, but 
Table 4 
Relative Projected Positions of 4 Groups on 
2 Dimensions of Cognitive Style 
Dimension 
Number of Amount of 
Group Categories Scanning 
Idealized High High 
Normal 
Nonparanoid High Low 
Schiz. 
Paranoid Low High 
Schiz. 
Obsessive High High 
Compulsive 
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the resemblance is confounded when tests of figure closure 
are examined (see Appendix B). Such tests combine, in terms 
of correct response, factors of speed and accuracy. Thus 
high scores reflect competence in both areas while low scores 
indicate weakness in speed, accuracy, or both. 
The picture for inhibition scores is also difficult. 
Extremely high inhibition would seem to def late SI through 
either decreasing scanning, as an analog of interpersonal 
anxiety, or as a reducer of social practice. The other ex-
treme, that of relative lack of inhibition, may adversely 
effect SI, but the "how" of this relationship is difficult 
to conceptualize. It may indicate a propensity to take the 
center of attention too often and therefore, "unwisely," 
but this appears to place too great a burden on the likaness 
of one personality variable to overt behavior. 
The questions of how an SI score is affected by cog-
nitive style variables and that of what factor the given SI 
scores measures, are interdependent. That is, not all of the 
SI abilities appear to be equally dependent on scanning or any 
other single dimension. Thus it remains to reexamine that part 
of the Structure of Intellect model which Guilford (1967) 
calls "Behavioral." 
O'Sullivan et al. (1965), described the nature and 
development of several tests of SI. Later, O'Sullivan and 
Guilford (1966) published the Six Factor Tests of Social 
Intelligence. Both sources indicated that research has, so 
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far, focused on the operation called Cognitive in relation to 
behavioral content. 
Four of the areas are: (a) Cognition of Behavioral 
Classes which requires the assembly of units (facial expres-
sions and postures for example) into congruent expressions of 
one thought, feeling or attitude; (b) Cognition of Behavioral 
Systems which requires the interpolation of a missing segment 
into a pictured social interaction; (c) Cognition of Behavioral 
Implications. Here the testee must determine which alter-
native represents the best completion of a serially depicted 
social event; and, (d) Cognition of Behavioral Transformations 
wherein the testee must select the alternative that most 
radically changes a depicted social process. 
Some theoretical statements can now be made about 
the connections of these four factors to previously postu-
lated dimensions of cognitive style. The Expression Grouping 
subtest requires the subject to integrate cues from different 
sources into a one unified social message. Low scanning 
reduces the probability of attending to these various cues and 
could result in Expression Grouping scores indicating impair-
ment in low scanners. 
Less obvious are the effects of the remaining di-
mensions of cognitive style, number of categories and in-
hibition. One effect of an extremely low number of cate-
gories would be to reduce scores on tests of cognition of 
behavioral transformations, e.g., Picture Exchange, via lack 
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of ability to build complex sets. This, however, is prob-
lematic. It does appear that the model of cognitive style is 
too simplistic to predict any main effect for the factor of 
transformations. 
To venture beyond the so-called obvious predictions, 
it may be more useful to consider sets of dimensions as applied 
to groups and predict selective SI deficits. 
In Table 5, are listed three gross diagnostic sub-
groups and their respective tendencies expressed as high or 
low, on three dimensions of cognitive style. 
Note that while the schizophrenic categories contain 
other subgroups, the nonschizophrenic grouping is defined 
by a process of exclusion. Since it is composed of patients 
with various types of pathology, it is too heterogeneous to 
be simply characterized on these dimensions. 
The schizophrenic subgroups are differentiated most 
clearly (Table 5) by the dimensions of category number and 
amount of scanning. Scott (1962) proposed a Differentiation 
Index which would yield the number of categories used by 
individuals. Scanning, on the other hand, has been related to 
the factors of speed of figure closure and inhibition (Cattell, 
1965). Measures of these respective factors are the Closure 
Speed Test (Thurstone & Jeffrey, 1960) and factor "H" ex-
tracted from Cattell's 16 PF Test (Cattell & Eber, 1957). 
Extremely high scores on these tests are expected to indicate 
low scanning extremely low scores, relatively slow figure 
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Table 5 
Difference Between Subgroups by Dimension 
of Cognitive Style 
Dimension 
Number of 
Subgroup Categories Inhibition Scanning 
Paranoid 
Schizophrenic Low Low High 
Nonparanoid High High Low 
Schizophrenic 
Nonschizophrenic Variable for all dimensions 
closure and low inhibition, are related to high scanning 
activity. 
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This analysis leads to the prediction of differences 
in social intelligence and cognitive style between schizo-
phrenic subgroups. Selective SI deficits are posited to be 
characteristic of the schizophrenias. While defining the 
exact place of such deficits in etiology is beyond the scope 
of this paper, these impairments are proposed to be distinct 
from other measures of ability and from the effects of hos-
pital confinement. Any evidence for a selective impairment 
would be negated if schizophrenics were found to score sig-
nificantly lower than nonschizophrenics on a variety of 
measures, i.e., verbal intelligence as well as SI. 
Hypotheses 
1. Subjects diagnosed as schizophrenic have sig-
nificantly lower scores on the SI tests Missing Pictures and 
Cartoon Predictions than subjects with diagnoses other than 
schizophrenia. 
2. Subjects diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic will 
have higher scores on the SI test, Expression Grouping, than 
subjects in other diagnostic categories. 
3. Subjects diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic will 
show a lower mean nwnber of cognitive categories as measured 
by Scott's Differentiation Index than subjects with diagnoses 
other than paranoid schizophrenia. 
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4. Nonparanoid schizophrenics will have a higher 
mean number of cognitive categories, as measured by Scott's 
Index, than patients with diagnoses other than schizophrenia. 
5. There will be a significant negative correlation 
between closure speed, as measured by the Closure Speed 
Test (Thurstone & Jeffrey, 1960) and Expression Grouping 
scores. 
6. Scores reflecting low inhibition (Cattell's factor 
"H, 11 ) will correlate positively with Expression Grouping. 
ME THO~ 
Subjects 
Subjects were drawn from those admitted to Chicago 
Read Mental He«lth Center for in-patient psychiatric care. 
Patients resided in wards D-North and o-south. 
Ninety percent of these patients were from the 
Chicago areas called Lincoln Park, Loop and Lower North. 
All patients were from lower to lower middle socio-economic 
level i.e., many were on Public Aid or had a gross income 
of less than $6,000.00 per year. The mean years of formal 
education was just under 10 with a range of five to 14. 
Testing was attempted on 56 subjects. Of these, 29 
could not be given the entire test battery. Fourteen re-
fused to cooperate to the conclusion of the test series. 
Testing was halted on another seven subjects when evidence 
was found to make their inclusion doubtful, e.g., organic 
states, perceptual handicaps. Another eight subjects left 
the hospital by transfer, discharge, or unauthorized absence 
before completion of testing. 
Of the 27 subjects teste(j, 14 were female and 13 were 
male. The breakdown by category was: nonschizophrenic, 
nine; nonparanoid schizophrenic, ten; and, paranoid schizo-
phrenic, eight. Appendix D shows subgroups composition by 
sex, age, and educational level. 
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Two considerations influenced the selection of 
subjects. First 6 symptoms such as hallucinations had to 
be mild so as to not interfere with testing or distort its 
results. Second, there had to be reasonable agreement as 
to the subject's diagnosis, i.e., subjects were assigned to 
one of three groups, paranoid schizophrenic, nonparanoid 
schizophrenic, or nonschizophrenic on the following bases: 
a. If a subject were a readmission, previous diag-
noses were considered for agreement. 
b. If previous diagnoses were variable, the opinion 
of two senior clinicians was sought. If there continued to 
be no agreement, the subject was not tested. 
c. If a subject were a first admission, the procedure 
outlined in "b" above was followed. 
Three subtests were taken from the Six Faster Tests 
of Social Intelligence (O'Sullivan & Guilford, 1966). Ex-
pression Grouping requires the testee to integrate diverse 
behavioral cues such as posture or facial expression into a 
congruent whole. Missing Pictures presents the subject with 
a series of photographs of an ongoing social situation in 
which one picture is left out. The subject's task to to 
select the alternative picture that best completes the depicted 
situation. Cartoon Prediction presents a series of social 
situations in which the last or concluding cartoon is omitted. 
The subject's task is to select the alternative cartoon that 
represents the best or most usual conclusion to the situation. 
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All of these instruments are scored by the formula, number 
correct minus a fraction of the numLer wrong. The fraction 
represents the number of alternate responses. Omitted items 
were not deducted from the score. 
An important consideration is whether or not a def-
icit in SI, found in any of the above tests, reflects an SI 
deficit, or merely that a given subgroup is deficient in a 
number of areas. Accordingly, the Verbal scale of the 
Shipley-Hartford (1946) series was included to determine if 
groups were equivalent in areas other than SI. This test is 
in multiple choice format and requires the testee to select 
a synonym for each stimulus word. Scoring is done by counting 
the number of correct choices. 
The H scale or inhibition was extracted from the 
Sixteen Personality Factor Test (Cattell & Eber, 1957). The 
format is multiple choice and all items are shown in Appendix 
A. Scores for this test are reported in raw form (Hr) and 
weighted form (Hw). The latter represents conversions from 
a table by Cattell and Eber which is based on the general 
population sample. No standard score tables currently exist 
for psychiatric samples and the general population conversion 
made identification of extreme scores easier. 
Scott's Differentiation Index (1962) completed the 
battery. It was used to give an approximation of the number 
of categories used by a subject in differentiating a small 
sample of other persons. Time considerations forced the 
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simplication of the test. Preliminary steps used to define 
significant others and roles were eliminated. The revised 
format is shown in Appendix B. 
Instructions were taken from Mehrabian (1968). The 
measure of the number of categories is the Differentiation 
Score or "H, 11 which was yielded by the formula: 
H - 1092 N-1/ N, I(Ni log2 ni) 
where log is to base 2, N = number of different names or 
persons used and ni is an index of those appearing in more 
than one group. 
Procedure 
No strict order of presentation of the seven sub-
tests was used. The Shipley verbal scale was, however, 
usually administered first as its format and content was 
considered to be more familiar to subjects, than that of SI 
tests. 
Factors such as time available to the patient that 
day, his or her cooperativeness and fatigue, were often 
decisive in determining which test or tests would follow 
the verbal scale. For all tests, save Scott's Differentiation 
Index, instructions were read to the subject. Once timed tests 
were begun, those in the SI series, no questions were answered. 
All remarks addressed to patients were those of encouragement. 
Before formal testing was initiated, and after the 
subject gave some indication that he would cooperate, the 
testee was told that the battery was experimental. Inter-
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pretation of the results would be given to his or her treat-
ment coordinator only if such results could help or provide 
useful information. The subject was also told that while 
the testing might not provide any definite help to him, the 
results, in total, might be of some help to other patients. 
Most testees required additional encouragement and 
explanation with the Scott Index. Despite these efforts, 
nine of the twenty-seven subjects who completed the other 
tests could not or would not complete the Scott Index. 
In no case did a testee respond unfavorably to 
positive reinforcement, "You're doing fine" or encouragement, 
"Just keep trying, 11 although such devices did not prevent 
some subjects from refusing to continue. While the data 
base is small, three cases, it does not appear advisable 
to proceed with other SI tests, if a subject is unable to 
cope with the SI instrument that is presented first. 
RESULTS 
Table 6 presents the means, medians and standard 
deviations by subgroup and total sample for the following 
tests: the Verbal scale from the Shipley, Figure Closure 
Speed, Inhibition raw and weighted scores, Missing Pictures, 
Cartoon Predictions and Expression Grouping. 
Inspection of Table 6 reveals that the paranoid sub-
group scored approximately the same as nonschizophrenics on 
all measures. Both groups showed higher mean scores than 
the nonparanoid schizophrenics. 
Table 7 presents the results of a one-way analyses 
of variance (Winer, 1962) for the three groups. This 
analyses yielded significant differences between groups 
for three measures, Inhibition (standard scores), Missing 
Pictures, and Expression Grouping. Table 8 presents the 
results of ~ tests between all combinations of subgroups 
for the three tests. This table, in conjunction with the 
presentation of means in Table 5 shows that paranoid schizo-
phrenics and nonparanoids did not significantly differ in 
any measure, but that each of these groups scored signif-
icantly higher than the nonparanoid schizophrenics on all 
three measures. Thus Hypotheses 1 and 2 were supported. 
Subjects diagnosed as nonparanoid schizophrenic scored 
lower than other subjects on Missing Pictures. Cartoon 
Table 6 
Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation Scores by Test, Subgroup, and Total Sample 
Group 
Nonparanoid Non- Paranoid 
Schizophrenic Schizophrenic Schizophrenic Total 
N=Q N=lO N=B N=27 
Test Mean Md s . .i.). Mean Md S.D. Mean Md S.D. Mean Md S.D. 
Verbal 23.0 21.5 8.4 28.2 30.0 8.1 26.6 27.5 7.8 25.8 24.0 8.3 
Figure 
Closure 11.6 11.0 3.0 15.6 15.0 6.1 14.3 14.0 4.2 13.7 14.3 4.9 
Inhibition 
Raw Score 8.4 8.6 3.2 11.8 12.0 5.0 14.8 14.0 3.5 11.4 13.0 4.8 
Inhibition 
Weighted 3.8 4.0 1.2 s.o 5.0 1.8 6.0 6.0 1.3 4.9 5.4 2.6 
Missing 
Pictures 7.1 6.7 1.8 10.3 10.0 2.3 9.5 9.7 2.0 8.9 8.7 2.6 
Expression 
Grouping 10.8 11.5 3.5 17.0 17.7 4.6 18.3 19.1 3.7 15.4 16.5 5.2 
Cartoon 
Predictions 14.6 15.7 4.0 17.5 18.3 2.9 17.4 18.3 2.9 16.9 17.4 3.8 
~ 
()'\ 
, 
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Table 7 
F Ratio Value from One-Way .Analyses of Variance by Test for 
the Schizophrenic, Non-schizophrenic and Paranoid Groups 
Test F 
Verbal 1.1 NS 
Figure Closure 1.5 NS 
Inhibition-raw Score 2.9 NS 
Inhibition-standard score 4.7 .OS 
Missing Pictures 6.5 .01 
Cartoon Predictions 1.5 NS 
Expression Grouping 7.0 .01 
Table 8 
Results of t Tests for Three Measures 
Test 
Inhibition 
Standard 
Score 
Missing 
Pictures 
Expression 
Grouping 
by Subgroup Pairings 
Paranoid 
Nonparanoid 
Schizophrenic 
t 
10.5 .01 
6.6 .01 
11.2 .01 
Groups 
Paranoid 
and Non-
Schizophrenic 
t 
1.1 NS 
1.9 NS 
1.7 NS 
413 
Non-Schizo-
phrenic & 
Nonparanoid 
t 
2.5 .05 
8.8 .01 
8.6 .01 
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Predictions did not differentiate the subgroups as expected, 
and the relative superiority of paranoid schizophrenics on 
Missing Pictures was not predicted. Hypothesis 2 did not 
predict the obtained lack of difference between paranoids and 
nonschizophrenics on Expression Grouping. 
Table 6 does not show group scores for Scott's Index. 
Of the 27 subjects only 16 yielded scorable protocols for 
this measure. A modification of the Kruskal-Wallis Analysis 
of Variance (Siegel, 1956) was applied to this smaller N, 
with a finding of no significance of difference between sub-
groups. Therefore Hypothesis 3 which predicted significantly 
lower scores for paranoids was not supported. Similarly, 
Hypothesis 4, which predicted a higher mean number of cognitive 
categories for nonparanoid schizophrenics, was not supported. 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 concerned correlations. Table 
9 presents Spearman Rank Order Correlations between all 
measures by subgroup and total sample. Hypothesis 5 predicted 
a significant negative correlation between Closure Speed and 
Expression Grouping. Although small negative correlations 
were found for the paranoid (-.24) and nonparanoid schizo-
phrenic (-.08) subgroups for these measures, the correlations 
were not significant and the hypothesis was not supported. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted a significant positive cor-
relation between Inhibition and low scoring on Expression 
Grouping. Rho ranged from -.25 to +.28 and did not reach 
significance. Hypothesis 6 was not supported. 
, 
Table 9 
Rank Order Correlations between Tests by Subgroup and Total Sample 
Test 
Figure Raw Score Missing Cartoon Expression 
Test and Group Closure Inhibition Pictures Predictions Grouping 
Verbal: 
Total .48** .24 .25 .47** .31 
Nonschizophrenic .42 -.27 .61* .37 .35 
Schizophrenic .46 .49 -.22 .89** • 52 
Paranoid .32 .31 .25 -.06 .. 05 
Figure Closure: 
Total .51** .17 .21 .24 
Nonschizophrenic .70* .35 .07 .20 
Schizophrenic .39 -.42 .43 -.08 
Paranoid -.40 -.02 -.32 -.24 
Inhibition Raw Score: 
Total • 02 .24 .14 
Nonschizophrenic -.33 -.30 -.25 
Schizophrenic -.12 .37 .04 
Paranoid .13 •• 33 .28 
Missing Pictures: 
Total .44 .59** 
Nonschizophrenic .35 .63* 
Schizophrenic -.29 -.14 
Paranoid .91** .57 
Cartoon Predictions: 
Total .73** 
Nonschizophrenic .72* 
Schizophrenic .73* 
Paranoid .67* (JI 
0 
* 12 ~ • 05 ** E. ~ .01 (two tail test) 
DISCUSS IO~ 
Three concepts had a primary role in generating the 
hypotheses of this dissertation. These were: (a) the schizo-
phrenic syndrome is characterized by selective deficits in 
social intelligence abilities1 (b) the deficits are selective 
in that different forms of the syndrome are marked by dif-
ferent performance decrements of SI abilities i.e., paranoid 
schizophrenics would do well in tests involving scanning, 
but not well where cognitive flexibility was demanded; and 
(c) a given deficit can be understood in terms of the cog-
nitive style associated with the syndrome. Thus special 
attention given to the paranoid's wide scanning, one facet 
of his cognitive style. 
Two SI tests differentiated between the paranoid and 
nonparanoid forms of schizophrenia. It was hypothesized, 
however, that only one of these measures, Expression Group-
ing, would so delineate the groups. Moreover, the deficits 
predicted for paranoids in SI were not found and an inspec-
tion of the mean scores for all tests suggests that the 
paranoids' functioning was closer to that of nonschizophrenics 
than to that of the other schizophrenics. This similarity 
does not appear to mean that the paranoids and nonschizophrenics 
simply functioned better or more adequately than nonparanoid 
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sc11izophrenics. Had this been the case, all or nearly all 
of the measures employed would have yielded significant dif-
ferences to the detriment of the nonparanoid schizophrenics. 
A different conclusion is more consistent with the 
results. Namely, the groups used were defined in two instances 
by the principle of exclusion, i.e., ~schizophrenic and 
nonparanoid schizophrenic, and were thereby more heterogeneous 
than the paranoid sample. This leads to the spec,lation 
taat more clear cut deficits might be demonstrated if addi-
tional distinctions had been used, e.g., the continuwn of 
acute-chronic as suggested by Spohn, Thetford, and Cancro 
(1970). Adding a new dimension would yield more homogeneous 
groups. 
While the use of less heterogeneous samples might be 
useful, it also appears that the measures of SI and cognitive 
style may have presented certain problems. First of all, 
additional evidence is needed to demonstrate the relative 
independence of the SI measures developed by O'Sullivan and 
Guilford (1966}. Stated simply, such SI measures should cor-
relate more strongly with each other than with tests involving 
other traits or abilities. O'Sullivan and Guilford reported 
relatively low but significant correlations (i.e., .20 to 
.30) between SI and verbal intelligence measures. The 
tendency of results in the present paper favored the relative 
independence of SI tests. One measure however, Cartoon Pre-
dictions, was found to have a positive significant relationship 
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{.89) with the verbal scale. ~his last finding may be an 
artifact, and so may be the lack of differentiation between 
groups shown by Cartoon Predictions. However, all of the 
measures in the Six Factor Tests of Social Intelligence are 
still in the experimental stage and require further valida-
tion before artifact can be sharply distinguished from dif-
ferential functioning. For instance, studies utilizing the 
muntitrait-multimethod approach (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) 
would be advantageous in investigating the convergent and 
discriminant validity of SI measures. 
A second problem concerning the tests used in this 
paper was Scott's Differentiation Index (1962). This was to 
be a direct measure of the number of cognitive categories 
used in appraising other people. Even in its simplified form, 
Scott's Index appeared to be unsuitable for psychiatric in-
patients. If possible this index should be simplified and 
restructured to allow time for the subject to practice with 
the format. 
In view of the above, it is not at all clear that 
selective deficits in SI differentiate between psychiatric 
groups. Not only are the results inconsistent with this 
proposal, i.e., no significant differences found between 
paranoids and nonschizophrenics, but also the issue is clouded 
by questions concerning the sample and tests used. It remains 
to consider the model underlying the hypotheses. 
The structure of cognitive style as presented in this 
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paper was overly simplified. Three dimensions of this style 
had been identified as scanning, the number of cognitive 
categories used, and degree of social inhibition. Even 
if given the assumption that the number of dimensions is 
adequate, it now appears that the dimensions require further 
elaboration or that they be replaced. Moreover, it is doubt-
ful that one of the dimensions, scanning, was measured at all. 
Both points can be illustrated by considering the logical 
association made between scanning and figure closure. Rapid 
figure closure was proposed to interfere with scanning. 
Thus high scores in closure were predicted to correlate 
negatively with scores of Expression Grouping, a test assumed 
to require relatively wide scanning. Correlations ranged 
from -.24 to .24 and did not attain significance. Of most 
importance is the fact that the relationships of closure and 
Expression Grouping to scanning are merely inferential. 
There is no impelling reason to conclude that scanning was 
measured, even indirectly. 
One way of elaborating the dimension of scanning would 
be to more carefully study the relationship between it and 
closure. Speed of closure, in itself, is an insufficient 
index to scanning activity. Of equal or more pertinence is 
the efficiency of closure as identified by Holtzman (1970), 
i.e., the ability to select and store relevant data while in 
the approach phase of problem solving. In the final analysis, 
scanning should be replaced by speed and efficiency of closure 
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as a dimension of cognitive style. This step would provide 
direct measurement in place of inference. 
SUJ:.llh\~Y 
Selective differences in social intelligence (SI) 
abilities were hypothesized to differentiate among three 
psychiatric groups, paranoids, nonparanoid schizophrenics, 
and nonschizophrenics. The theoretical explanation for dif-
ferential SI functioning was the concept of cognitive style, 
defined as a typical approach to problem solving in the face 
of competing demands. Dimensions of cognitive style were 
identified as amount of scanning, number of cognitive cate-
gories, and degree of inhibition. 
Extreme positions on these dimensions were posited 
to reflect cognitive approachos .. which could interfere with SI 
abilities. Paranoids were predicted to evidence more scanning, 
but less inhibition and to use fewer cognitive categories than 
other schizophrenics. It was also predicted that paranoids 
would use fewer categories than nonschizophrenics. Non-
paranoid schizophrenics were predicted to show less scanning 
and more inhibition and to use more categories than non-
schizophrenics. 
A test battery was devised to assess social intel-
ligence and cognitive style. Three SI measures, Cartoon 
Predictions, Missing Pictures, and Expression Grouping, were 
taken from the Six Factor Tests of Social Intelligence. An 
inhibition scale (H) was extracted from Cattell's Sixteen 
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Personality Factor Questionnaire. Scott's Differentiation 
Index was used to indicate number of cognitive categories. 
Scanning was indirectly measured by speed of figure closure 
and Expression Grouping. A verbal intelligence scale was 
included for purposes of control and correlational study. 
Subjects were selected from receiving units of Chicago 
Read Mental Health Center. Of the 56 involved, 27 completed 
all or most of the battery. Most subjects could not understand 
the Differentiation Index. That measure was not included in 
the analysis and predictions about number of categories were 
not tested. 
No significant differences were found between patients 
diagnosed as paranoids and nonschizophrenics. Both groups 
scored significantly higher than nonparanoid schizophrenics 
on the SI measures, Expression Grouping and Cartoon Predic-
tions. Paranoids had significantly lower inhibition scores 
than nonparanoid schizophrenics. Expected correlations be-
tween Expression Grouping figure closure and inhibition were 
not found. However, the groups were roughly equivalent in 
verbal intelligence. 
Consequently, predicted selective deficits in SI were 
not demonstrated. Reexamination of the proposed model of 
cognitive style indicated that it was overly simplistic and 
that the connection proposed between scanning and the SI test, 
Expression Grouping, was probably erroneous. The differences 
found between paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics suggest 
further research in the relationship of SI to Differential 
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Items from the H Factor of Cattell's 16 PF Test 
1. On social occasions I: (a) readily come forward; (b) 
respond in between; (c) pref er to stay quietly in the 
background. 
2. I get slightly embarrassed if I suddenly become the focus 
of attention in a social groups (a) yes (b) in between 
(c) no. 
3. I am always glad to join a large gathering, for example, 
a party, dance, or public meeting (a) yes (b) in between 
(c) no. 
4. I ten~ to deep quiet in the presence of senior persons 
(people of greater experience, age or rank) (a) yes 
(b) in between (c) no. 
5. I find it hard to address a large group (a) yes (b) in 
between (c) no. 
6. My reserve always stands in the way when I want to speak 
to an attractive stranger of the opposite sex (a) yes 
(b) in between (c) no. 
7. I would rather have a job with (a) a fixed certain salary 
(b) in between (c) a larger salary but depending on my 
persuading people I am worth it. 
8. Quite small setbacks occasionally irritate me too much 
(a) yes (b) il between (c) no. 
9. I have as many friends of the opposite sex as of my own 
(a) yes (b) in between (c) no. 
10. Even in an important game I am more concerned to enjoy 
it than to win (a) always (b) generally (c) occasionally. 
11. I consider myself a very sociable outgoing person (a) 
yes (b) in between (c) no. 
12. In social contacts I (a) show my emotions as I wish (b} 
in between {c) keep my emotions to myself. 
13. I somewhat dislike having a group watch me work (a) yes 
(b) in between (c) no. 
14. I'm the energetic type who keeps busy (a) yes (b) in 
between (c) no. 
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A. Here is a list of words. Think of the person who best 
fits the meaning of each word. Put his or her name, 
nickname, or initials on the line after each word. 
Father Mother Friend 
~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ 
Spouse Boss Brother or Sister 
~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ 
Teacher Relative Enemy 
~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ 
Therapist 
~~~~ 
D. Arrange into groups the names you have listed in Part A 
above. Make as many groups as you can and feel free to 
place the same person in your different groups. Assign 
a letter to each of your groups in order to identify it. 
Once you have written out the lists of persons in each of 
your groups, we would like you to do the following. What 
made you place the different people in each of the groups? 
Please state your reason briefly. 
APPENDIX C 
Please f i II . 1n: 
CLOSURE SPEED 
Nome 
Age Sex 
(Gestalt Completion) 
Oc c upoti on 
!oared by: L.L. Thurstone, Ph.D. and T.E. Jeffrey, Ph.D. 
The Psychometric Laboratory The University of North Carolina 
Directions 
Below is an incomplete picture of a man pushing a wheelbarrow. A description 
of what the picture represents has been written on the black line under it. 
Dote 
Below are some more pictures for you to identify., Write your answers on the lines. 
' ) 
-
WHEN YOU GET THE SIGNAL TO BEGIN, open your booklet and identify 
more pictures of the same kind. Work as fast as you can until you are told 
to stop. If some pictures are too difficult, skip them, and return to them 
later if you have time. You may need more than one word to identify the 
picture fully. You will have three minutes to do as much as you can. 
STOP HERE. WAIT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. 
Copyright 1956 by Thelma G. Thurstone and T. E. Jeffrey 
Published by Industrial Relations Center · The University of Chicago 
1225 East 60th Street · Chicago, Illinoia 60637 
TMVF-120 
10-2-4000 
Identify the pictures. Return later to those you find difficult. 
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DO NOT STOP. GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE. 
I 
! • -' I 
r 
... 
, \ ~ 
t 
/' ' 
""'- \ ' 
•• •• 
.. .. 
•• 
STOP HERE. 
r 
APPENDIX D 
r 
Data by Subgroup-Age, Sex, Years of Education and Test Score 
Initial Sex Age Educ. v FC Hr Hw MP CP EG 
a. Subgroup Nonschizophrenic 
JS F 30 7 20 10 8 4 10.67 16.00 7.50 
PF F 33 13 28 19 19 8 8.33 11.00 8.25 
PD F 37 11 36 14 4 2 14.00 22.33 21.00 
SS F 30 6 31 11 6 3 10.00 12.00 11.00 
ML"i M 35 5 30 27 18 7 11.00 15.00 19.00 
JH M 63 8 35 16 15 6 7.67 19.33 16.00 
JL M 34 9 19 6 9 4 7.33 17.33 18.75 
RM M 29 12 40 22 12 5 14.00 24.00 24.00 
ES M 37 9 15 15 15 6 9.33 18.67 17.75 
b. Nonparanoid Schizophrenic 
MB F 25 8 40 14 10 5 5.67 19.67 16.50 
SS F 45 5 16 14 8 4 8.33 13.00 7.50 
SP F 42 7 24 11 10 5 7.00 18.00 14.50 
BW F 31 12 11 8 4 2 6.00 11.00 14.00 
MJ F 29 9 23 8 6 3 8.67 17.33 12.00 
SB F 30 11 20 11 8 4 8.67 6.67 5.50 
RB M 35 8 17 9 10 5 6.00 10.33 6.00 
PI M 49 7 21 13 3 1 4.67 15.00 9.00 
NL M 36 6 36 18 14 5 s.oo 18.67 11.50 
RH M 43 13 22 10 9 4 10.67 16.33 11.75 
c. Paranoid Schizophrenic 
EH F 47 5 25 14 11 5 8.33 16.00 20.25 
JG F 30 7 39 16 11 5 7.00 12.00 9.25 
NW F 36 9 19 13 14 6 9.33 19.00 17.75 
EM F 35 11 17 14 22 9 6.33 14.00 18.25 
IG M 31 13 32 5 18 7 13.00 21.33 20.50 
GZ M 37 12 33 21 14 5 11.00 17.67 18.00 
AG M 23 7 23 17 13 5 12.00 20.00 20.00 
RZ M 29 13 30 14 16 6 10.00 19.00 22.25 
f 
APPENDIX E 
Comparison to Mean and Standard Deviation of Psychiatric 
Sample to Sample of O'Sullivan and Guilford (1966) 
Test 
Expression Missing Cartoon 
Grouping Pictures Predictions 
Psychiatric Mean 15.4 8.9 16.9 
Sample s.o. 5.2 2.6 3.8 
From O'Sullivan Mean 19.1 13.2 20.9 
and Guilford s.o. 3.7 2.6 3.0 
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